Superlative Modifiers as Modified Superlatives by Coppock, Elizabeth
Proceedings of SALT 26: 1–15, 2016
Superlative modifiers as modified uperlatives*
Elizabeth Coppock
University of Gothenburg &
Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study
Abstract The superlative modifiers at least and at most are quite famous, but their
cousins at best, at the latest, at the highest, etc., are less well-known. This paper
is devoted to the entire family. New data is presented illustrating the productivity
of the pattern, identifying a generalization delimiting it, and showing that the
cousins, too, have the pragmatic effects that have attracted so much attention to
at least and at most. To capture the productivity, I present a new decomposition
of at least into recombinable parts. Most notable is the at-component (silent in
some languages), which takes advantage of the comparison class argument of the
superlative to produce the set of possibilities involved in the ignorance implicatures
that superlative modifiers are known for. A side-effect is a new view on gradable
predicates, accounting for uses like 88 degrees is too hot.
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1 Introduction
As Geurts & Nouwen (2007) observed, the superlative modifiers at least and at
most are intriguingly different from the comparative modifiers more than and less
than. For example, at least is felt to be an odd choice in the following example
for a speaker who knows how many sides a hexagon has, while more than is not
problematic in the same way (Nouwen 2010):
(1) a. #A hexagon has at least six sides.
b. A hexagon has more than five sides.
Support for the existence of such a contrast in out-of-the-blue contexts comes from
an informal experiment I have conducted several times while giving talks on this
subject: When English speakers are informally asked to guess which of the following
examples is attested, and which is constructed, they typically guess correctly:
* Thanks to Chris Kennedy for extensive discussion on a prior draft of this system that was presented
as part of a joint talk at the Two Days at Most workshop in Utrecht, September 2015; thanks also to
the participants of that workshop.
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(2) a. I am in my sixties and had at least three parents growing up.
b. I am in my sixties and had more than two parents growing up.
The at least variant in (2a) furthermore typically elicits a chuckle, as it suggests that
the author of the statement does not know how many parents he or she had growing
up (or doesn’t know how to define ‘parent’). This ignorance implicature, along with
a number of other properties, has been placing high demands on the ink supply.1,2
But, as Krifka (2007) points out, despite all the attention, the internal structure of
superlative modifiers, containing a superlative, has rarely been recognized. Recog-
nizing this structure makes it possible to account for the productivity of the pattern:
We have not only at least and at most, but also at best, at the latest, at the highest,
and others. To my knowledge, only a few have recognized this, including Krifka
(2007) (handout; brief mention), Penka (2010) (handout) and Solt (2011: 6-10). The
present paper critiques this prior work, and offers an alternative solution.
The solution is built on two observations, one new in this paper (as far as I know)
and one not quite as new. The new observation is that the phrase being modified
must be interpretable as a measure along the dimension indicated by the gradable
adjective to which the superlative attaches. The less new observation is that all
superlative modifiers have the interesting pragmatic properties of at least and at
most, such as ignorance implications.
Based on these observations, the paper offers a decomposition of at least into
recombinable parts, including a superlative ending and a special meaning for at. The
at-component takes advantage of the comparison class argument of the superlative to
produce a set of possibilities involved in the ignorance implicatures that superlative
modifiers are known for. In a nutshell, at least three denotes a set of Hamblin alter-
natives containing numbers that are as high as three or higher, and these alternatives
‘fan outwards’ to yield a disjunction-like proposition of the kind used in inquisitive
semantics.3
1 Krifka 1999, Geurts & Nouwen 2007, Krifka 2007, Büring 2008, Cohen & Krifka 2011, Nakanishi
& Rullmann 2009, Cummins & Katsos 2010, Nouwen 2010, Penka 2010, Solt 2011, Mayr 2013,
Biezma 2013, Schwarz 2013, Coppock & Brochhagen 2013, Nouwen 2013, Penka 2014, Westera
& Brasoveanu 2014, McNabb & Penka 2014, Kennedy 2015, Schwarz 2016b, Schwarz 2016a,
Alexandropoulou, Dotlacil, McNabb & Nouwen 2015, Alexandropoulou 2015, Rett 2014, Blok 2015,
Mendia to appear, and certainly others to whom I owe an apology.
2 Westera & Brasoveanu (2014) show that some explicit QUDs, namely yes/no questions, can eliminate
the ignorance implicature for superlative modifiers. However, the difference remains in place in some
contexts, including ‘how many’ questions. Comparative modifiers also signal ignorance implicatures
in such contexts, but to a lesser degree, so it seems that the ignorance inferences triggered by
comparative modifiers are of a somewhat different, less obligatory nature than those triggered by
superlative modifiers, given both Westera and Brasoveanu’s data and the contrasts observed in
out-of-the-blue contexts.
3 See www.illc.uva.nl/inquisitivesemantics.
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2 Data
2.1 Productivity: A generalization
Evidence that at least and at most are not fixed expressions comes from the produc-
tivity of this pattern. Penka (2010) discusses the case of frühestens and spätestens ‘at
the earliest/latest’ in German. For English, corpus uses can be found of at least the
following: at (the) best, at (the) worst, at the earliest, at (the) latest, at the longest,
at the highest, at the lowest, and at the fastest.4
(3) [T]he officers have arguments which I feel are fatuous, fallacious, erroneous
and at best equivocal.
(4) I hope to be back in action for the second race or, at the worst, the third.
(5) I must be away by eleven at the latest, though.
(6) [A] final decision is not expected until the end of the month at the earliest.
(7) The natural life of a hen is seven years, at the oldest, while a battery hen
may last two and a half years.
(8) ... the court saying it was bound to limit the period to one year at the longest.
(9) It is worth noting that even if there is some discrepancy between government
numbers and real unemployment, economists still put the number at 15.6
percent at the highest, according to PolitiFact.
(10) Capital would return 15 percent at the lowest.
(11) These groups move much more slowly than trains—only several miles per
hour at the fastest.
However, there seem to be some restrictions on what can be modified. The
following strike me (and those I have consulted) as anomalous to the point of being
nearly uninterpretable, so I label them with an asterisk.
(12) *You may invite Sarah at the oldest.
Intended: You may invite (someone as old as) Sarah or someone younger.
(13) *The room will fit this table at the longest.
Intended: The room will fit this table or something shorter.
The problem, intuitively, is that Sarah is not an age, and no table is a length. I
therefore suggest the following generalization: Superlative modifiers only modify
expressions that occupy a position on the scale indicated by the gradable predicate.
4 English also has at (the) minimum, and at (the) maximum, which will not be covered by the present
analysis, as well as variants involving possessives such as at his worst, at his finest, which seem less
restricted: He was 200 pounds at his heaviest is perfectly acceptable, in contrast to (1).
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This is more straightforward in some cases than others. It is no problem to consider
‘the end of the month’ as a position on the earliness scale, or ‘seven years’ as a
position on the oldness scale (for a hen). But is‘equivocal’ a level of goodness (rather
than something that has a distinct level of goodness)? If we allow that it is, in this
context, then we can rule out (12) and (13) on the grounds of a general constraint that
the modified element must constitute a degree on the scale named by the gradable
predicate to which the superlative attaches.5
2.2 Ignorance effects
Crucially, all of the superlative modifiers identified above give rise to the ignorance
effects that have been shown for at least and at most. This was observed for temporal
superlative modifiers by Penka (2010). Consider also the following contrast after
checking one’s watch:
(14) a. It’s after 5 o’clock now, so we should stop.
b. #It’s 5 o’clock at the earliest now, so we should stop.
Or imagine informing your co-worker that the time is 4:45, and hearing one of the
following responses:
(15) a. Well, it’s before 5, so we should keep going.
b. #Well, it’s 5 o’clock at the latest, so we should keep going.
The examples with superlative modifiers are not appropriate in these non-ignorance
contexts.
This extends beyond temporal superlative modifiers; consider the following
statements after opening one’s report card:
(16) a. ?Oh no, I got worse than a B in Calculus.
b. #Oh no, I got at best a C in Calculus.
Although (16a) is not completely natural, (16b) is quite distinctly more odd. Or
suppose that you have just learned that your friend’s mother is turning 67 years old
tomorrow. Then only the first of the following variants would be appropriate as a
response:
5 This restriction would still overgenerate somewhat, though with less severe consequences; the
following examples involve cases where a measurement is modified by the at-expression and they
still don’t sound completely natural:
(i) ?I suspect that he weighs 200 pounds at the heaviest.
(ii) ?My algorithm is O(n2) at the slowest.
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(17) a. Oh, she’s older than 65, so she must be eligible for Social Security.
b. #Oh, she’s 65 at the youngest, so she must be eligible for Social Security.
Thus, superlative modifiers generally carry an ignorance implication, and this fact is
not limited to at most and at least.
Another difference that has been observed between comparative and superlative
modifiers is that the latter have been observed to give rise to strong upper-bounding
inferences under ability modals. As Geurts & Nouwen (2007) observe, at least and
fewer than give rise to different inferences under weak deontic modals:
(18) a. You may read at most 3 books.  no more
b. You may read fewer than 4 books. 6 no more
The same holds for at the latest, at the worst, and at the oldest:
(19) a. You may arrive at 5pm at the latest.  no later
b. You may arrive earlier than 5pm. 6 no later
(20) a. You may earn a B at the worst.  no worse
b. You may earn better than a C. 6 no worse
(21) a. You may be 12 at the oldest.  no older
b. You may be younger than 12. 6 no older
These judgments appear quite clear and consistent across all superlative modifiers; I
conclude that the inferences should be attributed to at, not to at least and at most
specifically.
3 Analyses of superlative modifiers
As mentioned above, superlative modifiers have been keeping the ink producers
in business. For the purposes of situating the present proposal, let us divide up
the existing proposals for how to analyze them along two axes. The first axis is
what kind of scale superlative modifiers are thought to make reference to. Kennedy
(2015), following Nouwen (2010), evokes a scale over degrees, as one can infer
from the following lexical entries:
(22) a. at least λmdλP〈d,t〉.max(P)≥ m
b. at most λmdλP〈d,t〉.max(P)≤ m
Thus, assuming that three denotes a degree, at least three denotes a generalized
quantifier over degrees (type 〈dt, t〉). This type of analysis is capable of accounting
for intricate data involving modals, and relates at most and at least to the grammar
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of degrees, but does not appear to cover uses of at least such as the following from
Cohen & Krifka (2011) involving an if not continuation, revealing what lies on
higher positions on the scale:
(23) This is at least misleading, if not wrong.
(24) The agent who bills such expenses is at least unethical, if not criminal.
(25) This is at least confusing, if not conflicting.
The modified element in these cases (e.g. misleading) does not appear to denote a
degree.
What we might call ‘discourse-based analyses’ invoke scales of pragmatic
strength, which are not restricted to numerals, and need not even respect entailment
(Beaver & Clark 2008). Examples in this category include Krifka 1999, Geurts &
Nouwen 2007, Büring 2008, and Coppock & Brochhagen 2013. Letting D stand for
‘is pragmatically stronger than’ (following Geurts & Nouwen (2007)), the following
is an example lexical entry following that approach (τ is any type, and p is an
abbreviation for 〈s, t〉):
(26) a. at least λα〈τ,p〉λβτλw.∃q[qDα(β )∧q(w)]
‘some alternative as strong as the prejacent is true’
(prejacent = α(β ))
b. at most λα〈τ,p〉λβτλw.∀q[q.α(β )→¬q(w)]
‘no alternative stronger than the prejacent is true’
This lexical entry, which effectively implements Beaver & Clark’s (2008) MIN
operator (argued to be presupposed by only), is more flexible than the degree-based
one, straightforwardly covering cases like at least misleading. The observations in
the foregoing section, however, suggest that with a sufficiently liberal conception
of the degrees with which one measures along various dimensions, one which
allowed ‘misleading’ to constitute a degree on some contextually relevant scale
below ‘wrong’, we would be able to circumscribe the felicitous uses of this at-
construction and rule out nearly uninterpretable cases like (12) and (13). So it is not
clear that the discourse-based analysis has a clear advantage over the degree-based
analysis purely on the basis of this kind of evidence.
Another dimension along which analyses of superlative modifiers vary is how
the ignorance implicature is derived. The field of approaches is too broad to cover
in its entirety here, so I will just mention three. Büring’s (2008) idea was to see
superlative modifiers as being akin to disjunctions; in the same way that ‘φ or ψ’
conveys that both φ and ψ are epistemically accessible options, ‘at least n’ conveys
that both n and more than n are epistemically accessible. Similar intuitions have
been implemented using (neo-)Gricean reasoning about alternative expressions to the
superlative modifier that the speaker could have used. Representatives of this strategy
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include Mayr (2013), Rett (2014), Kennedy (2015), and Schwarz (2016a). Schwarz
assumes that at least and only form a Horn scale, and that the set of numerals does as
well, so among the expression alternatives for at least three are at least four, at least
five, etc., as well as only three, only four, etc. The resulting structure of alternatives
yields ignorance implicatures through Fox’s (2007) method of innocent exclusion.
According to Nouwen (2010), the ignorance implicature with at most relies
on a “reinterpretation” process introducing a speaker epistemic possibility modal.
Nouwen’s semantics generates a reading for (27) on which it is equivalent to (28) on
an “exactly” reading.
(27) Jasper invited at most 10 people.
(28) Jasper invited 10 people.
Nouwen claims that this reading is blocked because it can be expressed through
a simpler form. The hearer therefore reinterprets (27) as a statement about what
the speaker holds possible, and an epistemic possibility modal for the speaker is
introduced into the interpretation through a non-compositional rescue operation.
A third strategy for generating the ignorance implicature sees superlative mod-
ifiers as alternative-introducing expressions akin to who as analyzed by Hamblin
(1973), irgendein as analyzed by Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002), or any as analyzed
by Aloni (2002). Coppock & Brochhagen (2013) couch this latter strategy in the
framework of inquisitive semantics, where declaratives and interrogatives alike de-
note sets of ordinary propositions, in the style of Hamblin’s treatment of questions.
Schematically, this analysis for John read at least three books might be represented
as follows:
John read

...
5
4
3
 books.
These alternatives ‘expand outwards’ as Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002) put it, so that
the denotation of John read at least three books is a set of propositions, one for each
number: {‘John read three books’, ‘John read four books’, ...}. For Coppock &
Brochhagen (2013), the ignorance implicature is generated through a generalization
of Groenendijk & Roelofsen’s (2009) maxim of ‘Inquisitive Sincerity’, which they
call ‘Interactive Sincerity’. In slogan form, it says: ‘Don’t raise an issue that
you know how to resolve’—and asserting a sentence whose denotation is a set of
propositional alternatives amounts to ‘raising an issue’.6
6 It has been observed for wh-ever constructions that ignorance is just one in a family of inferences,
including indifference, agreement-to-disagree, and others (Condoravdi 2014). The same seems to
apply to at least and at most, so this maxim should be generalized appropriately.
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The present paper follows a strategy involving Hamblin alternatives, and builds
up a semantics of superlative modifiers from a semantics for superlatives. The basic
idea is that the comparison class for the superlative corresponds to the set of Hamblin
alternatives. (It is not clear to me that such a natural connection between superla-
tives and superlative modifiers would be available under the approach involving
expression-alternatives to at least, but this is for future research to determine.) The
proposal will deviate from Coppock & Brochhagen’s (2013) in restricting superlative
modifiers to degree-type arguments, but in principle the analysis should nevertheless
be flexible enough to maintain the advantages of the discourse-based approach.
4 Previous decompositions
The only existing works that provide a compositional derivation of the semantics of
superlative modifiers from the semantics of superlatives that I am aware of are Penka
2010 and Solt 2011. Both of these adopt an approach to ignorance implicatures in the
style of Nouwen (2010), where an epistemic uncertanty operator is inserted through
a non-compositional emergency repair operation. As the solutions are generally
quite similar, and Solt 2011 is a paper while Penka 2010 is only a handout, I will
focus on Solt’s (2011) solution.
Solt’s (2011) analysis is built on the following insight, which I fully endorse
although I will offer a different analysis: “What distinguishes the acceptable uses
[of superlative modifiers] is that there is a range of actual or possible values under
consideration, and not just a single value. This constraint mirrors a restriction on
the superlative to situations where the comparison class has multiple members.”
Thus, “the non-singleton requirement is captured as a presupposition on -est that the
comparison class it introduces have multiple members.”
Formally, under Solt’s (2011) analysis, at most is analyzed as most, where most
is decomposed into -est and much, following Hackl (2001). She assumes Heim’s
(1999) lexical entry for -est, according to which it denotes a function that accepts
three arguments: a comparison class C, a gradable predicate G, and an individual
x. The function is defined if x is in C and C has multiple members, and returns true
if x has a greater degree of G-ness than any distinct member of C. She assumes
furthermore that, in a case like Fred has read at most 15 Shakespeare plays, the
members of the comparison class C are sets of degrees, rather than mere degrees or
individuals. So for the Shakespeare example, the comparison class contains all sets
of degrees I where I is a set of degrees d such that Fred has read at least d plays.
Since this is a singleton set, the presupposition that C have multiple members is
not satisfied. Emergency insertion of an epistemic possibility modal will save the
day, though: If C consists of all sets of degrees I containing possible numbers of
Shakespeare plays that Fred has read, then C may contain multiple members. As she
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puts it, “Informally speaking, the comparison class C might be taken to be the set
of numbers n such that Fred might have read n Shakespeare plays.” (As she shows,
this strategy will not work if C is allowed to contain mere degrees rather than sets of
degrees, because then the comparison class will contain multiple members from the
start, and there will be no need for emergency insertion of the epistemic modal.)
There are several challenges for this account, all inherited from Nouwen 2010.
First, the conditions under which an epistemic operator is inserted are not spelled
out, nor is the process by which it gets inserted. Second, as a matter of fact, speaker
uncertainty is not part of the truth conditions for superlative modifiers; indeed it is
not always implied, as shown by for example by cases like Computers of this kind
have at most 2GB of memory (Nouwen 2010), where the superlative modifier is
associated with a range of values rather than ignorance. The alternatives may also
be distributed across conversational participants in an “agree to disagree” situation.
If you are certain that the house has 9 foot ceilings and I am certain that it has 10
foot ceilings, we can agree that the ceilings are “at least 9 feet high”. Ignorance is
only one member in a “family of implications” (Condoravdi 2014) that can include
variation, agreeing to disagree, and others. What is needed, therefore, is a framework
that produces ignorance implications in certain contexts but not others, ideally in a
compositional manner.
5 Proposal
The strategy pursued here is to derive the uncertainty/variation from the introduction
of alternatives, as under Coppock & Brochhagen’s (2013) analysis (henceforth C&B)
in Inquisitive Semantics; however, we build on Penka/Solt’s insight that the range
is related to the comparison class of the superlative. The analysis to be derived
is one which gives as a meaning for an at least sentence the set of possibilities
that are as strong as or stronger than the prejacent according to the contextually
salient pragmatic strength ranking D. Since the sentence denotes a non-trivial set of
possibilities, an ignorance implicature is derived (see Coppock & Brochhagen 2013
for details).
The proposed decompositional analysis of at least builds on Bobaljik’s (2012)
Containment Hypothesis, according to which superlatives contain comparatives:
SupP
CompP
AP
tall
Comp
-er
Sup
-t
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To foreshadow how the connection between degree semantics and pragmatic strength
rankings will be made: The taller component in tallest is analogous to the less
component in least, which I suggest encodes the pragmatic strength ranking in the
case of at least.
In order to allow at least to project alternatives, I assume a semantic framework
in which natural language expressions are translated to expressions of a formal logic
that denote a set of intensions.7 Intensionality is handled using explicit quantification
over worlds, and the world argument comes first. So the translation for tall would be
as follows:
(29) tall {λwλdλx . tallw(d)(x)}
On the right-hand side of the squiggly arrow (indicating the “translates to” relation) is
an expression denoting a singleton set containing a function from worlds to relations
between degrees and individuals, following the standard line on gradable predicates
(e.g. Heim 1999). Nothing new regarding the analysis of gradable adjectives here;
this is just to illustrate the framework.
To get a meaning for something like tallest, we need a meaning for taller, which
in turn is derived from tall plus a semantics for the comparative marker -er that
yields phrasal comparatives. This phrasal semantics for -er can be stated in our
framework as follows:
(30) -er {λw .λG〈d,τt〉λ sτλ tτ . max(λd .Gw(d)(t))> max(λd .Gw(d)(s))}
Thus -er denotes a singleton set containing a function that expects, along with a
world argument, a gradable predicate G, a standard s, and a target t, and returns true
if the target is G to a greater extent than the standard. I assume that this is derived
via type-shifting from a more basic version of -er that forms the basis of an -er that
can in clausal comparatives, but I will not spell out how that works here.
I also assume a matching version of less that can be used in phrasal comparatives:
(31) less {λw .λG〈d,τt〉λ sτλ tτ . max(λd .Gw(d)(t))< max(λd .Gw(d)(s))}
Ultimately I would hope to derive this from a decomposition of less into little
and -er (Rullmann 1995; Heim 2006; Büring 2007; Heim 2008), and maybe even
divide little into not and much (Wellwood 2014), but I am not aware of any existing
decompositional analysis of phrasal comparatives of inferiority, and it would take us
too far afield to develop one here.
7 In terms of Ciardelli & Roelofsen’s (2015) typology of frameworks, this is an ‘alternative semantics’,
where all expressions denote sets, as opposed to what they call a ‘possibility semantics’, where
sentences denote sets of propositions but composition involves standard Functional Application and
Predicate Abstraction. I do this because I find it more intuitive in the present setting and the only rule
needed for the examples considered here is Functional Application. Nothing hinges on this choice
though; the theory could just as well have been stated in a possibility semantics.
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For the superlative, I assume the following lexical entry (setting aside the pre-
suppositions). The types of the variables are indicated using subscripts; τ is any
type, and the parentheses are used to indicate set-types.
(32) -t {λw .λR〈τ,τ p〉λC(τ)λxτ .∀x′τ ∈C .x 6= x′→ Rw(x,x′)}
Thus the superlative effectively saturates the ‘standard’ argument of the comparative
with a universal quantifier. It denotes a function which expects, besides a world w, a
relation R between two elements of type τ , and a comparison class C, which is a set
of things of type τ , hence type (τ). The relation R might be saturated by something
like taller, and the result would mean ‘taller than everything in C’. Note that this is
quite similar to Szabolcsi’s (2012) entry except that it is placed inside set-brackets,
because we are working in alternative semantics.
To put meanings together, I assume the following general composition rule, a
pointwise, intension-friendly version of functional application that is compatible
with the present style of formalization using translations:
(33) Functional Application
Let α and β be the only sub-trees of the tree γ . If:
• α  α ′, where α ′ is of type (〈s,〈σ ,τ〉〉)
• β  β ′, where β ′ is of type (〈s,σ〉)
Then: γ  {λw. f (w)a(w) | f ∈ α ′∧a ∈ β ′}.
Thus the analysis tree will have the following structure. As the types are rather
complicated, the fundamental types — corresponding to extensions at particular
worlds – are highlighted in blue:
(〈s,〈(e),et〉〉)
〈s,(〈〈e,et〉,〈(e),et〉〉〉)
-t
(〈s,〈e,et〉〉)
(〈s,〈〈d,et〉,〈e,et〉〉〉)
-er
(〈s,〈d,et〉〉)
tall
The meaning for taller that we derive, then, is as follows:
(34) taller {λwλ sτλ tτ . max(λd . tallw(d)(t))> max(λd . tallw(d)(s))}
Feeding this into superlative -t, we have
(35) tallest 
{λw .λC(τ)λxτ .
∀x′τ ∈C .x 6= x′→max(λd . tallw(d)(x))> max(λd . tallw(d)(x′))}
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Before coming to superlative modifiers, it will be necessary to introduce a
supplementary non-standard treatment for gradable predicates (which will also
work with the analysis of comparatives and superlatives given so far). Recall the
generalization observed in §2.1 above: that superlative modifiers are only acceptable
when modifying something that can be construed as a measure along the dimension
indicated by the gradable adjective. This suggests an analysis of, for example, at
least equivocal, according to which it denotes a set of degrees of goodness of which
‘equivocal’ is the best. Likewise, 5 o’clock at the earliest denotes a set of times
of which 5 o’clock is earliest, 5mph at the fastest denotes a set of speeds of which
5mph is the fastest, and 15 percent at the highest denotes a set of percentage rates of
which 15 percent is the highest. But this raises an interesting philosophical question:
If the things to be measured are themselves degrees on the relevant scale, then what
does it mean for them to be measured by a gradable predicate? Does it make sense
to see, for example, 5mph as faster than 4mph, or the fastest of a given set of speeds,
given that 5mph is the value of the function that measures speed? Does it make
sense to say that 6 feet is taller than 5 feet, or that 30 degrees Celcius is warmer than
25 degrees Celcius? People do appear to speak this way; consider the following
attested examples:
(36) -30 degrees is warmer than -40 degrees. Neither would be considered warm
temperatures.
(37) I’m pretty sure 90mph is faster than the legal maximum speed on any UK
road.
(38) We know that one o’clock is later than 9’oclock on the same day if we know
that the first time is PM and the second is AM.
It is also possible to find attested examples of the following kind, with positive hot
being predicated of temperatures:
(39) 88 degrees is too hot for most New Jerseyans, survey finds.
But how hot is 88 degrees? How fast is 60mph? I suggest that the degree to which
88 degrees is hot is 88 degrees, and the degree to which 60mph is fast is 60mph.
But this relies on a slightly different interpretation of hot and fast, one which merely
presupposes that the subject of predication is a degree on the relevant scale, and
encodes an identity relation. So if the ordinary extension of a gradable adjective is
Gd,et , then there is a corresponding extension of the following form:
(40) λdλd′ .d = d′∧∂ (d ∈ dom(G))
where d ∈ dom(G) encodes the constraint that d is in the domain of the function G.
Thus, alongside (29), we have also:
(41) tall° {λwλdλd′ .d = d′∧∂ (d ∈ dom(tallw))}
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If a shift from an ordinary gradable predicate denotation to this kind of denotation
were implemented as an operation that imposes a certain cost, then the relative
rarity of the construction and the limited productivity of the superlative modifier
construction could potentially be accounted for.
We then have to allow comparatives and superlative to apply to these odd gradable
predicates, to form, along with superlative modifiers, kinds of constructions we have
just seen, with degree-denoting expressions in subject position. A comparative like
taller would be formed as a combination of (41) with the regular comparative marker
(30), which boils down to the following:
(42) taller° {λw .λddλd′d .d′ > d∧∂ (d′ ∈ dom(tall))∧∂ (d ∈ dom(tall))}
And the superlative is:
(43) tallest° 
{λw .λC(d)λxd .∀x′d ∈C .x 6= x′→ x > x′
∧∂ (x ∈ dom(tall))∧∂ (x′ ∈ dom(tall))}
Now for the famous at-operator, promised at the beginning. We assume that at
takes as an argument some function (like best) which is expecting both a comparison
class argument and an argument that will serve as the subject of the superlative
predication, presupposed to be part of the comparison class. The alternatives that are
projected are members of that comparison class. In other words, the idea is that at
best x denotes a set of alternatives y whose best member is x.
This can be implemented with the following lexical entry.
(44) at {λw .λS〈(τ),τt〉λxτ .yτ | y ∈ C∧Sw(C)(x)}
‘the set of things y in a comparison class C s.t. x is S [least/most/etc.] in C’
Note that this is an abuse of notation. Any expression of the form
{λv1...λvn.α | ψ(v1, ...vn,α)}
should be interpreted as an abbreviation for:
{ f | ∀v1...∀vn∀α : f (v1,vn) = α → ψ(v1, ...vn,α)}
So the proper notation for (44) is:
(45) at { f | ∀w∀S〈(τ),τt〉∀xτ∀yτ [ f (w,S,x) = y→ Sw(C)(x)∧ y ∈ C]}
but I find this less intuitive so I will stick to the abuse.
Let us see this in action, using one year at the longest. This phrase will have the
following structure:
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(〈s,d〉)
(〈s,d〉)
1 year
(〈s,〈d,d〉〉)
(〈s,〈(d),dt〉〉)
(〈s,〈〈d,dt〉,〈(d), t〉〉〉)
-t
(〈s,〈d,dt〉〉)
(〈s,〈〈d,dt〉,〈d,dt〉〉)
er
(〈s,〈d,dt〉〉)
long°
(〈s,〈〈(d),dt〉,〈d,d〉〉〉)
at
The logical representation we obtain for this is as in (46), based on a following
meaning for longest° parallel to the one given above in (43) for tallest.
(46) {λw .yτ | y ∈ C∧∀x′d ∈C .years(1) 6= x′→ years(1)> x′
∧∂ ((dom(longw))(years(1)))∧∂ ((dom(longw))(x′))}
Note that I am representing the meaning of ‘1 year’ using the expression years(1),
which is supposed to denote a degree on the (relevant) ‘long’ scale. I am of course
glossing over any polysemy and/or multidimensionality in the word long. Note
finally that, given the density of time, the set of alternatives generated must be dense,
and therefore infinite. Nothing in the theory of alternatives prevents this, as far as I
know, but it is not the kind of phenomenon we are used to. All this aside, we have a
good result: the meaning of one year at the longest turns out to be a set of degrees of
length upper-bounded by one year, as desired. Embedded in a sentence, this phrase
will function exactly as one year does, in terms of types. But the alternatives that are
projected can yield ignorance implications, upper-bounding inferences under certain
modals, and related properties.
Now, in the case of at least, it is not immediately obvious what (if anything) plays
the role of long in ‘at the longest’. We will assume that least is composed of less and
-t. But if less is like -er, then it needs to take a gradable predicate as an argument:
less what? I assume that it takes as an argument a contextually-specified gradable
predicate m which measures the magnitude of things in a way that correlates with
the pragmatic strength ranking D from Beaver & Clark (2008). So in the case of
at least, the comparative that is fed to the superlative ending is what I call lessm,
analyzed as follows:
(47) lessm {λw .λxτλx′τ . max(mw(x′))< max(mw(x))}
The result of combining lessm and -t is, after simplifying:
(48) least {λw .λC(τ)λxτ∀x′ ∈C .x′ 6= x→max(mw(x))< max(mw(x′))}
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For at least an assistant professor, this gives the set of ranks at least as great as
‘assistant professor’ – great in some contextually-determined sense. If we assume
that m functions in such a way that the alternatives produced by the clause are ranked
by D, then we can derive the discourse-based analysis.
In the case of numerals, we obtain the rather intuitive result that a phrase like
at least 3 denotes the set of numbers that are as high as or higher than 3. Assume
a version of less that expresses a relation between two degrees, and assume that
numbers denote degrees (fundamentally 〈d,dt〉). Then we have an analysis with the
following types:
(〈s,d〉)
(〈s,d〉)
3
(〈s,〈d,d〉〉)
(〈s,〈(d),dt〉〉)
(〈s,〈〈d,dt〉,〈(d), t〉〉〉)
-t
(〈s,〈d,dt〉〉)
less
(〈s,〈〈(d),dt〉,〈d,d〉〉〉)
at
The meaning we derive for this is:
{λw .d | ∃C[d ∈C∧∀d′ ∈C[d′ 6= 3→max(mw(3))< max(mw(d))]]}
i.e., something like the set {3,4,5, ...}, ignoring intensionality, and limiting our
attention to integers. Embedded in a larger sentence, each one of these numbers will
correspond to a possibility in the Hamblin set for the whole proposition.
6 Summary
This paper has given an alternative-based analysis of superlative modifiers, starting
from more basic initial assumptions than Coppock & Brochhagen (2013). In this
system, a phrasal semantics for the comparative is the input to the superlative
morpheme -t, and the at in superlative modifiers introduces alternatives in the
comparison class of the superlative. The introduction of alternatives accounts for
ignorance/variation effects without recourse to emergency insertion of an epistemic
operator, and the proposed lexical entry for at can be productively recombined to
produce other superlative modifiers with the same discourse properties.
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